GANDHI'S THEORIES AND STRATEGIES

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In large part, this paper on *Gandhi's Theories and Strategies* has evolved as a response to points made in the concept note for the seminar on *Gandhi and his Critics*. I argue that any discussion of a statement from Gandhi should be preceded by a recognition of the context of that statement. We should ask, did the statement form part of one of Gandhi's core theories? Or was it strategic, and connected to one of his public campaigns that he launched from time to time?

This distinction can of course be made for any public person who also advances a theory. The distinction should be made in Gandhi's case, too.

The concept note says:

Though the Gandhian discourse has become popular all over the world, his disinterest in penning down his political ideas into a strictly theoretical framework has generated a lot of confusion and misunderstanding.

Whether or not Gandhi articulated his political theories in a conventional form is undoubtedly an important question. It is true that in 1946, when he was asked to spell out his theory of satyagraha, Gandhi declined, saying he was made for action, not for expounding a theory.[1]

As the concept note suggests, he was disinclined to explain his political ideas in an academic way. It may be observed, however, that Gandhi's writings and doings offer at least three clear and unmistakable theories.

The first is the theory of satyagraha: nonviolent resistance to oppression. As every student of Gandhi knows, he formulated this theory in South Africa in 1906, applied it there to good effect, and then applied it for more than a quarter century in India, starting with Champaran, Bihar, in 1917. The impact on the ground was considerable. After much of India took part in the nonviolent resistance of 1930, which had begun with the Salt March, Churchill said in England that Indians had

'inflicted such humiliation and defiance as has not been known since the British first trod the soil of India'.[2]

Churchill was acknowledging the extraordinary effectiveness of India's nonviolent struggle. But there was a theory behind it. Gandhi argued that nonviolent resistance gave oppressed people a better chance in their struggle with powerfully armed oppressors, and also that justice won through nonviolence lasted longer than a victory won with arms.

On Gandhi's theory of nonviolent resistance, let me quote Professor James M. Lawson. In the 1950s and 1960s, James Lawson, now 95, was one of the closest colleagues of Martin Luther King Jr. In the decades since, Lawson has been viewed as possibly the most stimulating exponent of the theory of nonviolent struggle. In his latest book, *Revolutionary Nonviolence,* published last year, Lawson writes: 'As Albert Einstein is the father of Physics, so Gandhi of India is the father of nonviolence.'[3]

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The second theory that Gandhi offers is a principle of Indian nationhood. It answers two intimately related questions. One, to whom does India belong? Two, who belongs to India? Here is what Gandhi wrote in *Hind Swaraj* in 1909, i.e. 114 years ago:

> India cannot cease to be one nation because people belonging to different religions live in it. In reality there are as many religions as there are individuals; but those who are conscious of the spirit of nationality do not interfere with one another's religion.
>
> In no part of the world are one nationality and one religion synonymous terms; nor has it ever been so in India…
>
> Is the God of the Muslim different from the God of the Hindu?... There are deadly proverbs as between the followers of Siva and those of Vishnu, yet nobody suggests that these two do not belong to the same nation.[4]

That India belonged equally to all residents of India, no matter their religion, and that all residents belonged to India was Gandhi's view. This was Gandhi's theory of Indian nationhood in 1909. It remained his theory of Indian nationhood until his death in 1948.

This being Gandhi's understanding of nationhood, he rejected the so-called 'two-nation' (or 'two-nations') theory, which was advanced both by the Muslim League (from 1940) and by the Hindu Mahasabha (from the late 1920s). Gandhi rejected the pessimistic view (held by some influential sections among undivided India's Muslims as well as Hindus) that Hindus and Muslims could never live together in peace or as equals.

Rejecting the 'two-nation' theory, Gandhi also emerged in the 1940s as the strongest foe of India's division into two countries, one with a Hindu-majority and another with a Muslim-majority.

The Pakistan call was a frontal attack on Gandhi's vision. He contested the doctrine behind it:

> Why is India not one nation? Was it not one during, say, the Moghul period? Is India composed of two nations? If it is, why only two? Are not Christians a third, Parsis a fourth, and so on? Are the Muslims of China a nation separate from the other Chinese? Are the Muslims of England a different nation from the other English?
>
> How are the Muslims of the Punjab different from the Hindus and the Sikhs? Are they not all Punjabis, drinking the same water, breathing the same air and deriving sustenance from the same soil?[5]

In practical terms, said Gandhi in Mumbai in September 1940, it was 'worse than anarchy to partition a poor country like India whose every corner is populated by Hindus and Muslims living side by side'. Added Gandhi:

> I do not say this as a Hindu. I say this as a representative of Hindus, Muslims, Parsis and all. I would say to Muslim brethren, 'Cut me to pieces first and then divide India. You are trying to do something which was not attempted even during the [Mughal] rule of 200 years. We shall not allow you to do it."[6]

Seven years later, however, in the summer of 1947, Gandhi gave his reluctant consent to the Mountbatten Plan for India's partition. It is well known that Gandhi did so after Patel, Nehru, Rajagopalachari, Rajendra Prasad, and other Congress leaders had accepted the Mountbatten Plan, after most of Punjab's Sikh and Hindu leaders had demanded an East Punjab separated from Muslim-majority West Punjab, and after many of Bengal's Hindu leaders in the Congress as also Syama

Prasad Mukherjee of the Hindu Mahasabha had strongly demanded a Hindu-majority West Bengal separated from Muslim-majority East Bengal.

In fact, even before Mountbatten arrived in India to replace Wavell as Viceroy, the Congress Working Committee, influenced by non-Muslim opinion in Punjab and Bengal, had conceded partition in its resolution of 8 March 1947.[7]

Because he did not fast unto death to prevent the implementation of the Mountbatten Plan, Gandhi in effect reneged on the word he had given in September 1940. Questioned on this score in 1947, Gandhi replied that he could not oppose the great majority of his Congress colleagues and of the Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab and Bengal.

Moreover, there is little to indicate that a Gandhi fasting unto death against the Mountbatten Plan in the 1947 summer would have caused Jinnah and the Muslim League to change their position.

While critics can say that Gandhi went back on his 1940 word to be 'cut into pieces' before accepting partition, we should mark that Gandhi's rejection of the two-nation theory remained total. In 1947, even though the separation of Muslim-majority portions was accepted (enthusiastically by some, reluctantly by Gandhi and others), neither the people nor the leaders of India accepted that theory. What is more, the Constitution that free India adopted in 1949 embodied Gandhi's theory of Indian nationhood, providing equal rights to all Indians, irrespective of their religion.

Moreover, in April 1947 (when a joint Congress-League interim government was in office, under the British Viceroy), Gandhi made a bold and ingenious attempt to prevent partition. To preserve the unity of Punjab and Bengal and also of India as a whole, he proposed to Mountbatten that a Congress-supported Jinnah ministry in should replace the interim government in New Delhi.

Holding that the Congress's majority in the Central Assembly would prevent a Jinnah ministry from going too far, Gandhi fleshed out key components of his proposal: One, let Jinnah head a new interim government of his choice, comprising League members alone or including others as well. Two, unless the Viceroy was to rule that a League measure was against the national interest, the Congress would back the League government and its measures in the Central Assembly. And three, Punjab's private bands (Muslim, Hindu and Sikh) should be disbanded.

If Jinnah and the League were not willing, under these terms, to form a cohesive government, said Gandhi, Nehru and the Congress should be given the same opportunity.[8]

It was during a long meeting on 1 April that Gandhi presented his proposal to the Viceroy.[9] A 'staggered' Mountbatten obtained Gandhi's permission 'to discuss the matter with Pandit Nehru and Maulana Azad, in strict confidence, the next time they came to see me'.[10] Since Vallabhbhai's 'opposition to any such plan was well-known', he was excluded.[11] By now Patel had convinced himself that partition was the only solution; the alternative was civil war.[12]

When Gandhi and Mountbatten again met on 2 April, the Viceroy accused Gandhi of suggesting a League government but in fact planning a Congress one, for surely he expected Jinnah to reject the offer? However, the Viceroy (to quote his own words) became convinced of Gandhi's 'burning sincerity' when Gandhi offered all his services to the Viceroy to 'get the Jinnah government through, first by exercising his influence with Congress to accept it, and secondly by touring the length and breadth of the country getting all the people of India to accept the decision'.[13]

Half an hour after Gandhi had left him, Azad met the Viceroy, who recorded his discussion with the Congress's leading Muslim figure:

> I told [Azad] straightaway of Gandhi's plan, of which he already knew from Gandhi that morning. He staggered me by saying that in his opinion it was perfectly feasible of being carried out, since Gandhi could unquestionably influence the whole of Congress to accept it and work it loyally. He further thought that there was a chance that I might get Jinnah to accept it, and he thought that such a plan would be the quickest way to stop bloodshed.[14]

The Viceroy however secured Azad's assent to the view that other solutions might be more practical.[15] For although assuring Gandhi that he would examine the scheme, and privately admitting to his staff that 'it would not be very easy for Mr Jinnah to refuse Mr Gandhi's offer' and that 'basically Mr Gandhi's objective was to retain the unity of India and basically he was right in this'[16], Mountbatten, deeply attached to his own partition scheme, was in fact was hostile to Gandhi's proposal.

Troubled by the possibility of the Congress Working Committee endorsing the proposal, Mountbatten sought ideas from his staff to scuttle it. After a staff meeting

on 5 April (so Mountbatten's own records tell us), he 'decided to talk to Pandit Nehru that afternoon about Mr Gandhi's scheme'.[17] One of Nehru's close friends, V.K. Krishna Menon, was also encouraged to work on him. 'Krishna Menon and Ismay (chief of the Viceroy's staff), at Mountbatten's request, had a prolonged talk about Gandhi's proposals,'[18] and the Viceroy had Krishna Menon to lunch on his own as well.

A significant role was also played by V.P. Menon, the Viceroy's talented Reforms Secretary, who had cultivated close relations with Patel. It was V.P. Menon who wrote for Mountbatten and his team the paper entitled 'Tactics to be adopted with Gandhi as regards his scheme', which can be seen in volume 10 of the Empire's official *Transfer of Power* volumes.[19]

We do not have details of the various talks in the first ten days of April involving Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel, Ismay, Krishna Menon and V.P. Menon. But the record conveys both anxiety and activity regarding the Gandhi scheme. Aware of Gandhi's earlier hold over his Congress colleagues, Mountbatten feared a revival of the old magic. During a three-hour meeting with Jinnah on 9 April, when Mountbatten tested the waters, he found that the offer was likely to tempt the League leader.

As Mountbatten jotted down right after the talk, he began the interview by saying (not very truthfully, it must be said) that 'it was a daydream of mine to be able to put the Central Government under the Prime Ministership of Mr Jinnah himself'. Thereafter, Jinnah, who wanted Pakistan to include East Punjab and West Bengal, 'once more appealed' against 'a moth-eaten Pakistan'. Continues Mountbatten's record:

> Some thirty-five minutes later, Mr Jinnah, who had not referred previously to my personal remark about him, suddenly made a reference out of the blue to the fact that I had wanted him to be the Prime Minister. There is no doubt that it had greatly tickled his vanity, and that he had kept turning over the proposition in his mind. Mr Gandhi's famous scheme may yet go through on the pure vanity of Mr Jinnah![20]

But in two days the Viceroy's anxieties were over. Gandhi's Congress colleagues rejected his proposal, which was therefore never put to Jinnah. On the morning of 11 April Gandhi wrote a letter to Mountbatten, admitting defeat:

> I had several short talks with Pandit Nehru, and an hour's talk with him alone, and then with several members of the Working Committee last night about the formula I had sketched before you, and which I had filled in for them with all the implications. I am sorry to say that I failed to carry any of them with me except Badshah Khan…
>
> I felt sorry that I could not convince them of the correctness of my plan from every point of view. Nor could they dislodge me from my position although I had not closed my mind against every argument. Thus I have to ask you to omit me from your consideration. Congressmen who are in the Interim Government are stalwarts, seasoned servants of the nation and, therefore, so far as the Congress point of view is concerned, they will be complete advisers (94: 283-4).

The 'several members of the Working Committee' with whom Gandhi talked are not all identified in this record. If Azad was one of them (we do not know that he was), his rejection of the Gandhi scheme would have been inconsistent with his word to Mountbatten that the scheme offered the best hope of stopping bloodshed.

Nor do we know what passed between Gandhi and Nehru in their 'several short talks' or in their hour between themselves, when the 'heir' was in effect asked to agree to someone else becoming India's first Prime Minister. But it is likely that the discussion was less about personalities or positions and more about what was wise and feasible. The Congress leaders on their part had little doubt. A diary entry by C.R. tells us that 'Gandhiji's ill-conceived plan of solving the present difficulties' was 'objected to by everybody and scotched'.[21]

Yet the 'ill-conceived' plan was perhaps the last chance for peace and unity in India. It could have overridden the division conceded by the 8 March resolution of the Working Committee. Gandhi understood what its 'scotching' meant. On 11 April 1947, when two leaders of South Africa's Indians, Yusuf Dadoo and G.M. Naicker, called on Gandhi, he said to them that India no doubt stood

> on the threshold of independence. But this is not the independence I want. To my mind it will be no independence if India is partitioned and the minorities do not enjoy security, protection and equal treatment… If what is happening today is an earnest of things to come after independence, it bodes no good for the future.[22]

At least one of Jinnah's biographers, Stanley Wolpert, would later offer the view that Gandhi's plan 'might just have worked'. 'Surely,' Wolpert added, 'this was a King Solomon solution'.[23]

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Gandhi's third theory is of the individual's importance. In *Hind Swaraj* he had written that the individual satyagrahi would bend the knee before her own conscience but not before tanks or empires. This remained Gandhi's truth from *Hind Swaraj* until his last days. About two weeks before he was killed, Gandhi said:

> *14 Jan. 1948*: Society is made up of individuals. It is we that make society… If one man takes the initiative, others will follow and one can become many; if there is not even one, there is nothing (*Collected Works,* vol. 90: p. 425).

Gandhi's theory of the individual was highlighted during a discussion that Gandhi had with Nehru shortly after World War II ended. The two of them, and thousands of others, had recently been released from their imprisonment for Quit India. Independence was on the horizon. Everyone including Gandhi knew that Nehru was likely to be the leader of free India.

Initiated by Gandhi, the frank discussion about free India's future journey was conducted in talks and letters in October-November 1945. We have no record of the talks, but the letters are available. Gandhi said he stood by *Hind Swaraj*. Nehru said he stood by his disagreement with much of *Hind Swaraj*. Both admitted that they had no copy of *Hind Swaraj* to refer to!

But the two agreed on the importance of the individual. Gandhi wrote to Nehru:

> In [the] village of my dreams the villager will not be dull—he will be all awareness. He will not live like an animal in filth and darkness. Men and women will live in freedom, prepared to face the whole world. There will be no plague, no cholera and no smallpox. Nobody will be allowed to be idle or to wallow in luxury…
>
> The individual person should have control over the things… necessary for the sustenance of life. If he cannot have such control the individual cannot survive. Ultimately, the world is made up only of individuals.[24]

The freedom of the press too was only an aspect of the freedom of the individual. When in 1940 Gandhi was ordered not to print in his journals the arrest of Vinoba Bhave, Gandhi suspended the journals' publication and wrote:

> Let everyone become his own walking newspaper and carry the good news from mouth to mouth… [I can] tell my neighbour what I have authentically heard. This no Government can overtake or suppress. It is the cheapest newspaper yet devised and it defies the wit of Government, however clever it may be.
>
> Let these walking newspapers be sure of the news they give. They should not indulge in any idle gossip. They should make sure of the source of information, and they will find that the public gets all the information that they need without opening their morning newspaper… (*Harijan,* 3 Nov. 1940; *CW* 79: 330)

We can see that Gandhi was anticipating social media. I don't need to add that freedom of the press is a live issue in today's India.

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On questions of caste, inter-dining, and intermarriage, inconsistent quotes from Gandhi can be easily found. In most cases, the context explains the inconsistency.

In South Africa, Gandhi seemed to be in favour of satyagraha on issues of caste. When he heard that an Indian satyagrahi in prison had objected to sleeping near someone belonging to the scavenger caste, he termed the news 'humiliating'. In his weekly, *Indian Opinion,* Gandhi wrote in 1909:

> Thanks to these hypocritical distinctions of high and low and to the fear of subsequent caste tyranny, we have… turned our back on truth and embraced falsehood… I wish that Indians who join this movement also resort to satyagraha against their caste and their family and against evil wherever they find it. (*Indian Opinion,* 30 Jan. 1909; *CW* 9: 290-1).

Shortly after returning to India in 1915, Gandhi took an astonishingly radical step (given the condition of Indian society at the time) when he admitted Dalits into the Ahmedabad ashram that he had just opened. He took them in despite objections from his wife Kasturba and other close associates.

Later, however, in the 1920s and for much of the 1930s, while he raised the tempo of his attacks on untouchability, Gandhi seemed unwilling to criticize the caste system as such. He spoke instead of an ideal varna system, different from caste, where there was distinctiveness but also equality, while simultaneously admitting that such a system was purely imaginary.

Such a stand reveals Gandhi's wish not to completely alienate India's caste Hindus. They were crucial for the freedom movement and for Hindu-Muslim friendship.

From November 1935, however, after Gandhi had conducted a massive all-India campaign against untouchability, and after Ambedkar had sharply criticized him for not attacking the caste system directly, Gandhi changed his language.

On 16 November 1935, "Caste Has to Go", Gandhi wrote in his journal *Harijan* (*CW* 62: 121). Two months later, on 19 January 1936, Gandhi wrote in *Harijanbandhu,* his Gujarati journal, of 'unnatural and meaningless restrictions on intermarriage and inter-dining', adding, 'And that is why the country has stopped progressing.' (*CW* 62: 142).

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The concept note also states:

Subhash Bose, his former colleague and fellow traveller, who declared him the 'father of the nation', elucidates in his autobiography, The Indian Pilgrim*, his utter disappointment with Gandhi on the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience movement.*

Anyone reading what I've just quoted would conclude that after first declaring Gandhi as the nation's father, Subhas Bose was later 'utterly disappointed' with Gandhi because of the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience movement. In fact, as anyone even slightly familiar with the chronology knows, the temporary withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience movement occurred in 1934, whereas Subhas Bose's radio broadcast from 'somewhere in Southeast Asia' and addressed to Gandhi as the 'father of the nation', was made in July 1944, by which time the disappointment was a *ten-year-old* story.

The sentences I've quoted from the concept note about Gandhi and Bose are *immediately* followed by this categorical assertion about Gandhi and Nehru:

Later Nehru had a fundamental disagreement with him on the issue of complete independence against Gandhi's approval of Dominion status.

'Later' here can only mean after the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience movement, that is, after the year 1934. But the Gandhi-Nehru discussion over 'dominion status versus complete independence' took place between 1927 and 1929, long *before* 1934 – and the difference was *fully* resolved before the end of 1929.

There is another statement in the concept note on which I feel obliged to comment:

But Gandhi's difference of opinion with Subhash Bose snowballed into a historic fell-out going beyond dialogue and reconciliation.

Was this really the case? It was in 1939 that India observed the famous Gandhi-Bose clash over the latter's wish to serve for another year as Congress president. But this clash was short-lived.

In June 1940, a year *after* the clash, the two had a most cordial conversation, which Gandhi recounted in detail in the 13 July 1940 issue of *Harijan.* (*CW* 72: 259-61).

The next year, in 1941, as is widely known, Netaji escaped from house arrest in Kolkata and found his way first to Germany and then to Japan. In 1944 he delivered that radio broadcast in which he addressed Gandhi as the father of the nation. After Bose's death in 1945, some of his INA soldiers worked closely with Gandhi, including in Noakhali, now in Bangladesh.

These facts seem to indicate that there was nothing even remotely like 'a historic falling out that went beyond dialogue and reconciliation'.

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Then there is this sentence in the concept note*:*

His religious philosophy, Hindu in orientation, was meant to be all accommodative and based on 'Sarva Dharm Sambhav' (equal respect for all religions)*; but he made Khilafat the central plank of his first mass movement in India.*

Although repeated almost ad nauseam, this opinion that Gandhi made 'Khilafat the central plank of his first mass movement in India' has no basis in actual facts. It is only drummed-up propaganda that many have come to believe.

Let us recall the years 1919 and 1920, immediately following World War I. After decades of successful divide-and-rule policies, once the Jallianwala massacre occurred in April 1919, the Empire faced resentment from all Indians -- Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and everyone else.

Moreover, India's Muslims, hitherto cautious about opposing the Empire, had become deeply alienated from the British because the successful war waged by Britain and France against Turkey, which was Germany's ally in World War 1, signified European dominance over Islam's holy places in Arabia and Iraq, places that Turkey had controlled thus far.

Gandhi realized, and said publicly and repeatedly, that a chance which, in his words, 'might not recur for a hundred years' had opened up for a strong Hindu-Muslim alliance for India's freedom. This remark was made by Gandhi at least three different times in August 1920 alone.[25]

Moreover, Tilak, too, before his death in August 1920, blessed this Hindu-Muslim alliance. 'Hindus would support' Muslim decisions on Khilafat, he said.[26] Lala Lajpat Rai and hundreds of other staunch Hindus went to prison as part of this 'first mass movement'. Would any of them have done this had Khilafat been the movement's 'central plank'? The suggestion has no historical basis.

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Finally, let me address the insinuation that during his South African years, which began when he was 23 and ended when he was 44, Gandhi was some kind of a racist.

It is a fact that when demanding rights for Indians in South Africa, at times Gandhi spoke disparagingly, while making comparisons, of the Africans living there. This was a real failing, and one not confined to Gandhi. No Indian at that time, whether in South Africa or in India, corrected Gandhi on this score.

However, it is also a fact that Africans in South Africa were inspired by the Gandhi-initiated struggle there for the rights of Indians. Jan Smuts, one of South Africa's principal white leaders, declared in 1908 that the Gandhi-led Indian defiance he had faced in the Transvaal could lead one day to 'Kaffir' or African defiance.[27] A year before this, in 1907, Winston Churchill, who experienced South Africa as a reporter in 1899-1900, had written in his *African Journey* (p. 37) of white fears that Africans would learn 'evil ways' from Indians and start defying

white rule.

Also worth noting are the remarkable similarities in the lives of Gandhi and John Langalibalele Dube, one of the founders of the African National Congress. Dube was born into a princely Zulu family in Natal in 1871, two years after Gandhi's birth. Dying in 1946, two years before Gandhi's assassination, he was, practically speaking, Gandhi's exact contemporary.

Gandhi and his colleagues had formed the Natal Indian Congress in 1894. In 1912 (two years after the Union of South Africa, with Natal as one of its constituent parts, was created), Dube founded the South African Native National Congress, which in 1923 became the African National Congress, the political organization that has governed South Africa from 1994.

In 1901, John Dube and his wife Nokutela founded the Ohlange Centre near Phoenix, a town not far from Durban. Three years later, in 1904, Gandhi too started *his* centre in Phoenix. Gandhi's weekly paper, *Indian Opinion*, which had begun in Durban in 1903, was printed in Phoenix from 1904.

From 1904 onwards, whenever Gandhi was in Phoenix, he was Dube's close neighbour, and for a while Dube's paper was printed at Gandhi's printing press. Gandhi introduced Dube to the readers of *Indian Opinion* as an African 'of whom one should know' (*Indian Opinion,* 2 Sept. 1905).

A few months thereafter, Gandhi praised, in *Indian Opinion,* the efforts of another African figure, John Tengo Jabavu (1859-1921), to establish a college for Africans. Writing of 'an awakening people' and of 'the great Native races of South Africa,' Gandhi said that 'Indians in South Africa have much to learn from [Jabavu's] example.'[28]

Chief Albert Luthuli, president of the African National Congress from 1952 to 1967, had studied at Dube's Ohlange institution. In 1961, Luthuli (1897-1967) was awarded the Nobel Prize for his struggle in South Africa. In a talk in Washington DC in 1948, Luthuli had said that '[Gandhi's] efforts for his people inspired people such as Dr. John Dube and others to concern themselves with seeking human rights for their people.'[29]

According to Nelson Mandela, 'The Chief [Albert Luthuli] was a passionate disciple of Mahatma Gandhi.'[30]

It seems ridiculous to suggest that a racist had inspired John Dube, or that Chief Luthuli would become the 'passionate disciple' of a racist.

Something even more compelling is worth looking at. One hundred and fifteen years ago, on 18 May 1908, in Johannesburg, South Africa, Gandhi presented a remarkable vision for all the races of South Africa. In a speech made at the YMCA, which was published in Johannesburg's newspapers at the time, Gandhi said:

> [I]n studying the Indian question, I have [also] endeavored to study the question as it affects the Africans and the Chinese… we can hardly think of South Africa without the African races…
>
> If we look into the future, is it not a heritage we have to leave to posterity, that all the different races commingle and produce a civilization that perhaps the world has not yet seen? (*CW* 8: 323)

In the year 1908, no other Indian, whether in South Africa or in India, presented a picture even remotely similar to what I've just quoted. In 1908, even non-Indians did not speak of 'the commingling of races'.

Even in 2023, how many speak of it? On race, too, therefore, Gandhi comes across as a pioneer.

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[1] *Harijan*, 3 March 1946. *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 83: 180. The *Collected Works* volumes cited in this paper have been accessed on the Gandhi Heritage Portal.
[2] Churchill's remark in the House of Commons on 12 March 1931, in Robert Rhodes James (ed.), *Winston Churchill: His Complete Speeches* (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), vol. V (1928-1935), p. 4995.
[3] James M. Lawson Jr, *Revolutionary Nonviolence* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2022), p. 79.
[4] *Hind Swaraj* (edited by Anthony Parel), Cambridge University Press, pp. 52-53.
[5] *Harijan,* 28 Oct 1939, *Collected Works* 70: 283.
[6] Speech of 16 Sept. 1940, *Harijan Sevak,* 12 Oct. 1940, *CW* 73: 25-26.
[7] *CW* 87: 538.
[8] *CW* 87: 539-42.
[9] *CW* 87: 539-40.
[10] N. Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby (eds.) *The Transfer of Power, 1942-47* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), vol. 10, p. 69. Or *TOP* 10: 69.
[11] Pyarelal, *Last Phase,* 2: 80.
[12] See Rajmohan Gandhi, *Patel* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1990), p. 401.
[13] *TOP* 10: 84.
[14] *TOP* 10: 86.

[15] *TOP* 10: 86.
[16] *TOP* 10: 84.
[17] *TOP* 10: 128.
[18] Alan Campbell Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London: Robert Hale, 1962 edition), p. 57.
[19] *TOP* 10.
[20] *TOP* 10: 104.
[21] Entry dated 13 April 1947. Rajagopalachari Papers.
[22] *CW* 87: 257.
[23] Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah* (New York: Oxford, 1984), p. 317.
[24] The discussion can be seen in *Collected Works,* 88: 118-20, 329-31.
[25] Public meeting in Madras, 12 Aug. 1920, *CW* 18: 145; public meeting in Calicut, 18 Aug. 1920, *CW* 18: 150; article in *Navajivan,* 29 Aug. 1920, *CW* 18: 203)
[26] Tilak: "Hindus would support" Muslim decisions on Khilafat. The quote is in Dhananjay Keer, *Mahatma Gandhi* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1973), p. 324.
[27] Smuts quoted in Sushila Nayar, *Mahatma Gandhi* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan), vol. 4, p. 168.
[28] *Indian Opinion,* 30 Dec. 1905 and 17 March 1906.
[29] Scott Couper, *Albert Luthuli: Bound by Faith* (Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010, p.50.
[30] Mandela in his *Conversations with Myself*, (pp. 52-53), quoted by Vinay Lal, 'Mandela, Luthuli, and Nonviolence in the South African Freedom Struggle,' *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, 38(1), 2014. https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt5r64v5qg/qt5r64v5qg.pdf)